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JEANNINE JoHNSON 
NEWMAN, BARNETT (1905-1970), American artist. 
Revealing his characteristically incisive wit, Barnett Newman 
often quipped, "Aesthetics is to artists what ornithology is to 
birds." He meant that the activity of artists, like the behavior 
of birds, was not bound by any external system devised to 
explain or categorize it. Just as ornithology has no bearing on 
a bird's life, aesthetics-insofar as it is treated as a science­
is irrelevant to an artist's creative work. Newman rejected 
the idea that theoretical aesthetics, if narrowly construed as 
an investigation of the ru1es that supposedly govern art or as 
an inquiry into what constitutes the essence of beauty, could 
provide a guide for original content. 
And it was indeed the problem of art's content-its most 
authentic subject matter-that preoccupied Newman. What 
would that content be, and what would it mean? The infa­
mous answer Newman gave to the critic Harold Rosenberg's 
challenge for the painter to explain his works is second in its 
frequency of citation only to his wisecrack about ornithology. 
The context of the exchange was a social gathering in 1948. 
Newman-displaying the seriousness, even radicalism, of his 
intentions-claimed that to understand one of his paintings 
properly wou1d mean "the end of all state capitalism and to­
talitarianism." Somewhere in between the two quotes­
between the insistence on the art's autonomy and the respon­
sive viewership it aims to solicit-lies Newman's truth. 
Newman was philosophically minded-:-he majored in 
philosophy at the City College of NewYork (1923-1927)­
but he wasn't a professional philosopher. Unlike other art­
ists in his cohort who were reticent to speak about issues of 
aesthetics (at least in public), Newman broadcast his views 
to anyone who would read or listen. Essays, articles, inter­
views, lectures, reviews, political pamphlets, private cor­
respondence, letters to the editor: he issued them all. The 
wide range of Newman's erudite writing (stylistically levied 
by his earnest tone and brilliant humor) poses certain diffi­
cu1ties to synopsis. Each essay, like each of his paintings, 
is an abundant world. Rather than singling out his more 
famous statements and trying to key them to select paint­
ings, this introduction proceeds in sections matched to certain 
recurrent motifs of Newman's thought and practice, including 
isolation an:d tragedy; individualism and the self; autonomy 
and relationship; and politics. Grasping these structural 
themes will provide the reader with a framework for better as­
sessing the relationship of Newman's ideas to his art. 
Isolation and Tragedy. Many of Newman's writings the­
matize his dissatisfaction with what he took to be a retrograde 
historical and cu1tural situation. His 194 7 article "The First 
Man Was an Artist" employs the imagery of an atomic blast to 
figure the destructive tendencies of recent science: "In the last 
sixty years, we have seen mushroom a vast cloud of 'sciences' 
in the fields of cu1ture, history, philosophy, psychology, eco­
nomics, politics, aesthetics, in an ambitious attempt to claim the 
nonmaterial world" (Newman, 1990, pp. 156-157). Newman 
railed against the dominion of a positivist mentality that quanti­
fied all human experience but was incapable of addressing the 
central metaphysical issues of human existence. But the critic 
was too astute simply to oppose science and art. Newman, ever 
adept at beating the opposition on its home turf, took the posi­
tion that scientists had simply misunderstood the role of sci­
ence. Setting himself the task of winning true science back 
from the number crunchers, he accused them of abdicating 
their responsibilities by forgetting the proper nature of their 
activity, which was to discover not just facts, but the truth of 
human being. Scientific method, he argued, misleadingly identi­
fied truth with proof. This was a distortion of genuine scientific 
inquiry-which Newman aligned with creative artistic in­
quiry-and the relentlessness with which his cu1ture pursued 
the former and thus magnified the distortion constituted more 
than just professional failure. It amounted to a moral weakness 
that prevented the cu1ture from confronting its tragic state in 
the proper terms. But poetry and art, Newman thought, could 
express the metaphysical truth of the historical moment, and 
hold meaning for the future. He prized art over the limited 
instrumentalism of his contemporary world. Humanity's 
truest act was above all else aesthetic-� poetic outcry of"awe 
and anger ... before the void" rather than "a request for a 
drink of water" (p. 158). 
Born in 1905, Newman was twenty-four when the 1929 
stock market crash bankrupted his father's thriving clothing 
company. In the 1930s, he experienced the Depression and 
witnessed the rise of fascism in Europe. In the 1940s, he 
lived through a world war, learned about the atrocities of the 
Holocaust, and was distressed by the unprecedented de­
structive powers of the atomic bomb. And in the 1950s, he 
observed the consolidation of a postwar consensus cul­
ture-fueled by an aggressive McCarthyism-that seemed 
as effective in the United States as dictatorship was in the 
Soviet Union in extinguishing Leftist hopes of meaningful, 
collective social action. Newman interpreted the historical 
situation in moral terms. In a 1970 interview with the di­
rector Emile de Antonio, he put it this way: 
About twenty-five ·years ago [in 1945] for me painting was dead. 
Painting was dead in the sense that the situation, the world situation, 
was such that the whole enterprise as it was being practiced by 
myself and by my friends and colleagues seemed to be a dead enter­
prise . . .. What it meant for me was that I had to start from scratch as 
if painting didn't exist. .. . What [was I] going to paint? The old stuff 
was out. It was no longer meaningful. These things were no longer 
relevant in a moral crisis, which is hard to explain to those who didn't 
live through those early years. I suppose I was quite depressed by the 
whole mess . . . . We couldn't build on anything. The world was going 
to pot. It was worse than that. It was worse than that. 
(Newman, 1990, pp. 303-304) 
Newman's generation asked the question of what to paint 
without any assurance that an answer would be forthcoming. 
Nor could it be assumed that art's new subject matter­
whatever it turned out to be-was enough to ensure the qual­
ity of the art produced. In this tenuous situation, the query 
itself carried the weight of a moral decision. Answering it­
deciding-would entail acting in the face of doubt. Writing 
about Newman and his contemporaries in 194 7, the critic 
Clement Greenberg had expressed that "their isolation is in­
conceivable, crushing, unbroken, damning. That anyone can 
produce art on a respectable level in this situation is highly 
improbable" (Greenberg, 1986, Vol. 2, p. 170). A year later, 
again surveying the terrain of recent art, Greenberg put it 
bluntly: "Isolation, or rather the alienation that is its cause, is 
the truth-isolation, alienation, naked and revealed unto 
itself, is the condition under which the true reality of our age 
is experienced" (Vol. 2, p. 193). Although both Newman 
and Greenberg downplayed their connection to existential 
philosophy, sentiments such as these echo certain motifs 
found throughout the writings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, 
Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Heidegger (whose works Newman 
collected in his library). 
Newman confronted the situation Greenberg described. 
His hope was to create art that would be relevant to the world 
situation, even if it meant "creat[ing] an entirely different re­
ality" (Newman, 1990, p. 163). American painters, as he as-
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serted in "The Sublime Is Now" (1948), were freeing them­
selves of the "impediments" of European art· in order to 
produce "self-evident [images] of revelation, real and con­
crete" (p. 173). This reality, generated by the artist's "meta­
physical act," would respond to, without imagining away, the 
conditions of isolation and despair experienced by him and 
his peers (p. 164). It would thus provide for art an appropri­
ately "tragic subject matter" (p. 165). As he argued in the 
unpublished "The New Sense of Fate" (1948), modern man 
was "by his acts or lack of action" as open to the conse­
quences of an intimate, all-pervading fate as was the hero of 
a Greek tragedy (p. 169). 
Individualism and the Self. The metaphysical act was 
individual. It also carried political and existential meaning. 
In Fred Orton's view, Harold Rosenberg believed that the 
artist, finding the canvas "an arena in which to act," could 
maintain, on an individual level, the revolutionary political 
ideals that recently had failed on a larger, mass scale. For 
Rosenberg, their struggle to create credible art was authentic 
because it was "associated with risk and will." While political 
action was forestalled, the studio harbored agency. In action 
painting, the critic asserted, the ''artist's struggle for identity 
took hold of the crisis" of depersonalization within capitalist 
society. Individual action, in the form of what Rosenberg 
came to identify as a kind of existential "self-creation," com­
pensated for the impossibility of collective action. 
Thking a more skeptical viewpoint, this heroic narrative 
would seem to harbor a less ideal interpretation. It might be 
argued that as artists sensed the real conditions of and pos­
sibilities for collectivism ebbing away, they responded by 
clinging to ideological versions of individuality-to narratives 
of identity-that variously marked the artist as creative, ex­
pressive, or rebellious. Although expedient, such narratives re­
mained abstract and dogmatic, mere labels of individuality. 
They were not adequate to a deeply felt sense of an experien­
tially self-forming, and therefore more "real," self. And, while 
they may have been well suited to the burgeoning iconography 
of the brooding and recalcitrant artist (witness life magazine's 
1949 photo essay on the denim-clad Jackson Pollock, "Is he the 
greatest living artist in the U.S.?"), such normative social cate­
gories domesticated Abstract Expressionist artists by subordi­
nating whatever might be regarded as their genuine or au­
thentic selves to ready-made identities. On this account, 
individuality or identity, in their ideological forms, prevents the 
realization of the self, a process Newman and some of his con­
temporaries regarded as of primary significance for the con­
tent of art. "We are making [art] out of ourselves, out of our 
own feelings. The image we produce is the self-evident one 
of revelation, real and concrete," Newman declared in "The 
Sublime Is Now" (Newman, 1990, p. 173). Painting-at least 
the type of painting Newman aspired to realize-contested in 
its structures of beholding the problematic nature of modern 
"individuality," with its ready-made (and thus depersonalized) 
narratives of identity. Instead, it became a metaphysical endeavor 
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to discover the true self and to express a sense of self to a 
viewer. 
Newman worried about identity, and reflected on the 
problem of achieving one's self under the pressure to accept 
a ready-made, artificial model of selfhood determined by 
culture at large. As Richard Shiff has noted of modernity in 
general, when external culture, not internal drive, seems to 
regulate what personal desires are before they are felt, the 
situation implies a commodification of feeling (or, to put it 
in existential terms, a destitution of feeling). Alternatively, 
Newman wanted-as paradoxical as it might sound-:-to 
create his own self, "terrible and constant," as he once de­
scribed it (Newman, 1990, p. 187). But how would he know 
when he'd done so? 
During a three-day symposium in April 1950 that was in­
tended to bring artists and critics together to discuss perti­
nent issues of aesthetics and practice, Robert Motherwell, a 
moderator, proffered three names for the group of artists we 
now identify as the New York School: "Abstract-Expressionist; 
Abstract Symbolist; Abstract-Objectionist." Newman coun­
ter-proposed his own name, "self-evident" (Newman, 1990, 
p. 241). The term designates objective truth recognized; fig­
uratively, it implies a reflexive subjective relationship. It might 
be suggested that both senses of the term apply most mean­
ingfully to a canvas Newman regarded as particularly impor­
tant: Onement I ( 1948). 
Although this small painting measures only twenty-seven 
by sixteen inches, and appears to be just a single, cadmium 
red band (or "zip") bisecting a darker, slightly modulated, 
cadmium ground, it is difficult to overestimate the critical 
status of this canvas in Newman's body of work. "What it 
made me realize," Newman said in 1965, 
is that I was confronted for the first time with the thing that I did, 
whereas up until that moment I was able to remove myself from the 
act of painting, or from the painting itself. [Before] , the painting was 
something that I was making, whereas somehow for the first time 
with this painting the painting itself had a life of its own. 
(Newman, 1990, p. 256) 
"It was full," he explained (p. 306). It was also a rebirth, the 
"beginning of [his] present life," fittingly completed on an an­
niversary of his own origin, his forty-third birthday (p. 255). 
So significant was this occasion that Newman claims to have 
stopped working for nine months-coincidentally, the dura­
tion of human gestation-in order to contemplate what he 
had achieved. It would be fair to agree with Ann Temkin that 
Newman "equated the creation of this painting [with] the cre­
ation of [his] self" (Temkin, 2002). 
Arguably, Onement I acquired significance for the artist 
because as it took on a life of its own (as a consequence both 
of Newman's creative act as well as his practical or technical 
activity as an artist), the meaning of his act in relation to it 
became increasingly evident to him. Newman's act pro­
duced a meaning that was self-generated, but not imposed 
by fiat. It was metaphysical in the sense that it disclosed an 
unknown, open world-not an already known, determined 
one. The speculative aspect of this insight was grounded by 
Newman's practice as an artist, which taught him that just as 
no technical plan was necessary to make a painting, no tem­
plate of human action necessarily determined its course 
("I don't paint in terms of preconceived systems," the artist 
told David Sylvester in 1965). Perhaps, too, as the unantici­
pated meaning of his act-and the new relationship that act 
now sustained-became visible to him, Newman arrived at 
another insight. In a world in which the results of one's acts 
are unpredictable, the meaning of any and each act acquires 
a moral dimension. In painting, as in life, doing something 
might be better than doing nothing (alternatively, it might be 
worse). Newman's act is metaphysical also because it tran­
scends this potentially debilitating conundrum, moving 
things forward under varying conditions of uncertainty and 
in doubt of an unknowable future. 
Autonomy and Relationship. Self-evidence specifies. 
It refers to that which is actually present, conspicuous, or 
manifest. Something that is self-evident requires no proof: 
it is axiomatic, indubitable, certain, and conclusive. Onement 
I was the painting by which the fact of Newman's self was 
established as true. And that experience might also hold for its 
viewers, should they acknowledge the structure of beholding 
Newman intended to create. The painter often analogized the 
experience of beholding his paintings to the experience of 
facing another person. And like that experience, facing his art 
created a totality. Newman expressed it this way: 
When you see a person for the first time, you have an immediate 
impact. You don't have to really start looking at details. It's a total 
reaction in which the entire personality of a person and your own 
personality make contact. To my mind that's almost a metaphysical 
event. If you have to stand there examining the eyelashes and all that 
sort of thing, it becomes a cosmetic situation in which you remove 
yourself from the experience. (Newman, 1990, p. 306) 
At the same time, his paintings made viewers aware of their 
specific individual selves (in contradistinction to their con­
structed identities, or their personality types named by cul­
ture). Recognition of self was the first step in understanding 
mutual relationships: 
I hope that my painting has the impact of giving someone, as it did 
me, the feeling of his own totality, of his own separateness, of his own 
individuality, and at the same time of his connection to others, who 
are also separate, . . .  I think you can only feel others if you have some 
sense of your own being. (pp. 257-258) 
In Newman's thought, autonomy and relationship were re­
ciprocally determined. 
Politics. That reciprocity was the basis of Newman's an­
archic social ideal. Interested in politics throughout his life, 
he ran in 1933 for mayor of New York on a cultural platform 
that opposed doctrinaire forms of socialism and commu­
nism. In his 1968 foreword to Peter Kropotkin's Memoirs 
of a Revolutionist (1899), Newman expressed that anarchism 
embodied the "creative way of life that makes all program­
matic doctrine impossible" (pp. 45-46). This would be a true 
form of collective life that did not homogenize or dissipate 
individual interest. To the contrary, genuine collectivism, 
based on the anarchic idea of the "direct formation of social 
communities" nourishes the freedom of the individual 
(p. 51). Autonomy facilitates the creation of "spontaneous, 
self-organized communes, now fashionably known as partic­
ipatory democracy, based on mutual aid and respect for each 
person's individuality and person" (p. 46). 
Autonomy and relationship-the alternatives to isolation 
and identity-mean freedom, and freedom is maximized 
under conditions of social accord and psychological equilib­
rium. A harmony of inner and outer needs may be achieved 
in collective life. From this viewpoint, the term "collectivism" 
is best understood as more than just a type of social organi­
zation or ideology; it is rather a mode of comportment to 
one's self and to others. Only autonomous individuals can 
experience meaningfully their social relations with others. 
Recall Newman's unflinching retort to Rosenberg about the 
meaning of his paintings. Newman seemed to imply that the 
only way to fully recognize the debilitating consequences of 
any form of political or ideological control (or even dogmatic 
self-rule) over the individual, and the alienation and isolation 
he feels, is to experience its opposite, the interdependence 
of autonomy and relationship. Only then could an alternative to 
Newman's tragic historical reality become visible. 
[See also Sublime.] 
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NEW MEDIA. See Computer Art; Computing, Aesthetic; 
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NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. To treat the 
thought of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, 
this entry comprises five essays: 
Survey of Thought 
Nietzsche� Schopenhaue� and Disinterestedness 
Nietzsche's Literary Style 
Nietzsche and Visuality 
Nietzsche on Tragedy 
The first essay is an overview of Nietzsche's thought in gen­
eral as the background for his aesthetic theory; the author 
discusses many of the ways Nietzsche has been interpreted 
and how these interpretations affect our understanding of 
his aesthetics. The second essay is on Nietzsche's relation­
ship to a philosopher who was pivotal in the development of 
his thinking about art: Schopenhauer; it also explains Nietz­
sche's critique of aesthetic disinterestedness. The third essay 
concerns the apparent unity between Nietzsche's ideas 
about style and his aesthetics, whether in relation to litera­
ture, music, or any of the arts. The fourth essay examines 
Nietzsche's aesthetics in connection with the visual arts, and 
the final essay addresses his important views on tragedy. 
For further discussion, see Postmodernism; Tragedy; and 
Wagner, Richard. 
